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The interpretation of this relationship is straightforward. Suppose the lowest
level for s, i.e. s ! 0, the …rms market share is negligible and the intra-
sector market tends to be highly competitive. The equality between price and
marginal cost implies the highest production level: more workers are employed
in production, leaving few resources for R&D activity and, obviously, a lower
growth rate.
On the contrary, when the market share is maximum, no …rm has direct
competitors: setting the monopoly price, more workers are available for R&D
activities, and so, the growth rate raises. Furthermore, a lower degree of inter-
dependence among …rms leads to a higher level of pro…ts, giving more incentives
to innovation activities.
The relationship between the growth rate and market share can also be
analyzed by evaluating the derivative of gSS in (35) with respect to s:
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[s2(1 ¡ ¯) ¡ s(1 ¡ ¯) + 1]2 > 0.
Sustained innovations should be possible for s 6= 0. This means that a positive
growth rate results if, and only if, some intellectual property rights prevent the
free use of innovations.
Note that when s = 1, there is only one …rm per sector and this implies the
traditional Grossman-Helpman result:
gSSG¡H =
¹L
a
(1 ¡ ¯) ¡ ½¯. (38)
In their formulation the parameter ¯ plays a fundamental role with respect to
the product di¤erentiation degree. The lower it is, the lower is the level of
substitutability, ¾, between goods, and the higher is the pro…ts level; thus the
grows rate rises. On the other hand, when the product di¤erentiation is min-
imum (i.e. ¯ ! 1), the varieties are perfectly substitutable among themselves
and pro…ts are driven to zero. Now, there is no incentive for innovation because
zero pro…ts do not permit the recovery of the positive cost of R&D. The same
situation occurs when no patents exist (s ! 0).
3 Conclusions
The contribution of this paper can be found in its analysis of two market struc-
tures, usually considered as alternative types of competition.
In recent attempts to involve the strategic interaction in endogenous growth
models an ambiguous relationship emerges between the growth rate and the
degree of competition of market structure.
Here, denoting the degree of competition by the intra-sector market share,
the main result of the paper concerns its unambiguous e¤ect on the growth rate.
When the degree of competition is high, prices go down, the aggregate quantity
raises and the available labor force for R&D activity are reduced, so the growth
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rate falls. On the contrary, a lower interdependence among …rms leads to a
higher growth rate. The increasing in prices reduces the aggregate production,
more resources are available for R&D and the result is a higher growth rate.
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